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Abstract 
  Which choice will a player make if he can make one of two choices in which his own payoffs are 
equal, but his rival’s payoffs are not equal, i.e. one with a large payoff for his rival and the other with a 
small payoff for his rival? This paper introduces non-altruistic equilibria for normal form games and 
extensive form non-altruistic equilibria for extensive form games as equilibrium concepts of 
noncooperative games by discussing such a problem and examines the connections between their 
equilibrium concepts and Nash and subgame perfect equilibria that are important and frequently 
encountered equilibrium concepts. 
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1. Introduction 
  In the early 1950s, Nash (1950, 1951) defined noncooperative games and proposed an equilibrium 
concept, which is still the most prominent and most frequently encountered equilibrium concept today. 
In the middle of the 1960s, Selten (1965) pointed out the problem of Nash equilibria in extensive form 
games and proposed subgame perfect equilibria as a valid equilibrium concept for extensive form games. 
Afterwards, a great many equilibrium concepts for noncooperative games have also been proposed as 
refinements of Nash’s equilibrium concept. Of these, Aumann’s (1974, 1987) correlate equilibrium, 
Selten’s (1975) trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, Myerson’s (1978) proper equilibrium, Kreps and 
Wilson’s (1982) sequential equilibrium, van Damme’s (1984) quasi-perfect equilibrium, Kohlberg and 
Mertens’s (1986) Mertens-stable equilibrium, Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston’s (1987) coalition-proof 
Nash equilibrium, Cho and Kreps’s (1987) perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Maskin and Tirole’s (1988a, 
1988b) Markov perfect equilibrium, Fudenberg and Levine’s (1993) self-confirming equilibrium, and 
Mckelvey and Palfrey’s (1995, 1998) quantal response equilibrium are extremely well known. 
  Moreover, De Marco and Morgan (2008) introduce slightly altruistic equilibrium as a refinement 
concept for Nash equilibria. Rusinowska (2002) assumes that players can be either jealous or friendly 
towards their opponents’ payments and considers a bargain as a non-cooperative game. 
  We now consider the following simple example in Figure 1. This example is a simple two-by-two 
game where player i  ( 1,2)i  has two possible actions in his action sets ( iA  and iB ). The payoffs 
to the two players when a particular pair of actions is picked are given in the appropriate cell of the 
matrix. The first entry in each cell is player 1’s payoff for the corresponding strategy profile; the second 
is player 2’s. This example has two Nash equilibria: 1 2( , )A A  and 1 2( , )A B . The equilibrium payoffs 
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for 1 2( , )A A  are (10, 1). At this time, player 1’s payoff is 10, while player 2’s payoff is only 1. It can be 
said that this result is not good for player 2 if both players are in a rival relationship. Therefore, since 
player 2’s own payoffs are equal even if player 2 picks either of choices A  or B , player 2 will prefer 
to pick B , in which player 1’s payoff is lower. At this time, the equilibrium is only 1 2( , )A B . 
  We propose non-altruistic equilibria for normal form games, and extensive form non-altruistic 
equilibria for extensive form games as criteria for equilibria of noncooperative games. The basic idea 
behind their equilibrium concepts runs as follows. Consider a situation that involves two players, 
denoted 1 and 2. Player 2 can make one of two choices in which his own payoffs are equal, but player 
1’s payoffs are not equal, i.e. one with a large payoff for player 1 and the other with a small payoff for 
player 1. Which choice will player 2 make? If player 2 does not collude with player 1, then player 2 may 
make the choice that makes player 1’s payoff the lowest. Furthermore, in player 1’s decision before 
player 2 faces the choices, it can be said that the result is clear if player 1 makes the choice that makes 
player 2’s payoff the lowest. We will obtain new equilibria by discussing such a problem. 
  The purpose of this paper is to propose non-altruistic equilibria for normal form games and extensive 
form non-altruistic equilibria for extensive form games as equilibrium concepts of noncooperative 
games, and to show the connections between their equilibrium concepts and Nash and subgame perfect 
equilibria that are important and frequently encountered equilibrium concepts. 
  The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce and examine 
non-altruistic equilibria as a criterion for equilibria. Section 3 illustrates non-altruistic equilibria using 
some examples. Section 4 describes an extensive form game, and introduces extensive form 
non-altruistic equilibria as a criterion for equilibria. Section 5 illustrates extensive form non-altruistic 
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equilibria using an example. Section 6 concludes the paper. Appendix provides a different definition of 
non-altruistic equilibrium and compares this definition with that given in Section 2. 
 
 
2. Non-altruistic equilibria 
  Let us consider a game ( , ( ) , ( ) )i i N i i NG N S h  with a finite player set {1,2,..., }N n . iS  is a 
finite pure strategy set for each player i N , and S  is used to denote 1 ... nS S . Each player i  
has a payoff function ( , )i i ih s s  depending on the strategy combination ( , )i is s  played. The 
notation is  indicates a strategy combination 1 1 1( ,..., , ,..., )i i ns s s s  for all players except player i . 
  We present the following definition as a criterion for equilibria in normal form games. 
 
Definition 1: In G , a strategy combination * * *1( ,..., )ns s s  constitutes a non-altruistic equilibrium if 
and only if, every , ;i j N i j , 
    * * *( , ) ( , )i i i i i ih s s h s s , or 
    for * * *( , ) ( , )i i i i i ih s s h s s , 
* * *
; ;
( , ) ( , )j i i j i i
j N j i j N j i
h s s h s s      i is S . 
 
  In non-altruistic equilibria, each player gives high priority to his own payoff maximization and also 
conducts the other players’ payoff minimizing behavior. That is, if each player faces choices that his own 
payoffs are equal under his own payoff maximizing behavior, then he will make the choice that gives the 
lowest payoff for the other players. 
  Consider now the following proposition. 
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Proposition 1: In G , every non-altruistic equilibrium is also a Nash equilibrium, but not vice versa. 
 
Proof: It is clear that a non-altruistic equilibrium that satisfies * * *( , ) ( , )i i i i i ih s s h s s  also a Nash 
equilibrium and vice versa. 
  Therefore, we prove the case of * * *( , ) ( , )i i i i i ih s s h s s . Every strategy profile that satisfies 
* * *( , ) ( , )i i i i i ih s s h s s  is a Nash equilibrium. However, a non-altruistic equilibrium has to satisfy both 
* * *( , ) ( , )i i i i i ih s s h s s  and 
* * *
; ;
( , ) ( , )j i i j i i
j N j i j N j i
h s s h s s . In other words, a strategy profile 
that satisfies * * *
; ;
( , ) ( , )j i i j i i
j N j i j N j i
h s s h s s  for * * *( , ) ( , )i i i i i ih s s h s s  is a Nash equilibrium, 
and not a non-altruistic equilibrium (see Figure 1). This completes the proof of Proposition 1. Q.E.D. 
 
 
3. Examples of the normal form representation 
  We use three examples in order to illustrate non-altruistic equilibria. 
 
3.1. Example 1 
  Consider the example depicted in Figure 2. This example is a three-player game, where player 
( 1,2,3)i i  has two possible actions in his action sets ( iA  and iB ). The first entry in each cell is 
player 1’s payoff for the corresponding strategy profile; the second is player 2’s; the third is player 3’s. In 
this example, it is clear that the non-altruistic equilibrium is 1 2 3( , , )A A A , and the non-altruistic 
equilibrium payoffs are (4,4,4) . Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium is 1 2 3( , , )A A A  as well. In the 
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example, the non-altruistic equilibrium coincides with the Nash equilibrium. 
 
3.2. Example 2 
  Consider the following example in Figure 3. The second example is a three-player game, where 
player ( 1,2,3)i i  has three possible actions in his action sets ( iA , iB , and iC ). In this example, the 
Nash equilibrium is both 1 2 3( , , )A A A  and 1 2 3( , , )C C C , whereas the non-altruistic equilibrium is only 
1 2 3( , , )C C C . Although 1 2 3( , , )A A A  is a Nash equilibrium, it is not a non-altruistic equilibrium 
because player 1 will deviate to B . That is, player 1 will choose B  because the sum of players 2 and 
3’s payoffs from player 1’s choice of A  is smaller than that of players 2 and 3’s payoffs from player 1’s 
choice of B . The strategy profile 1 2 3( , , )B A A  is no non-altruistic equilibrium because player 3 will 
deviate to B . In each of twenty-seven cells, when a similar discussion is repeated, we know that 
1 2 3( , , )C C C  is a non-altruistic equilibrium because each player will not deviate, and the non-altruistic 
equilibrium payoffs are (5, 5, 5). 
 
3.3. Example 3 
  Consider the game in Figure 4. The third example is a three-player game, where player ( 1,2,3)i i  
has two possible actions in his action sets ( iA  and iB ). In this example, the Nash equilibrium is 
1 2 3( , , )B B B . However, player 3’s payoffs from 1 2 3( , , )B B A  and 1 2 3( , , )B B B  are equal, and the sum 
of players 1 and 2’s payoffs from 1 2 3( , , )B B B  is lower than that of players 1 and 2’s payoffs from 
1 2 3( , , )B B A . Therefore, in non-altruistic strategies, player 3 will prefer 1 2 3( , , )B B A  to 1 2 3( , , )B B B , 
and the strategic profile 1 2 3( , , )B B B  is no non-altruistic equilibrium. Furthermore, player 2’s payoff 
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from 1 2 3( , , )B B A  is lower than player 2’s payoff from 1 2 3( , , )B A A . Hence, we can see that this game 
has no non-altruistic equilibrium by confirming the same as the discussion above. 
 
 
4. Extensive form non-altruistic equilibria 
  A finite n-person extensive form game is described as a four-tuple ( , , , )T P U h , where the 
constituents are as follows. The game tree T  is a finite tree consisting of nodes and branches. The 
player partition 0 1( , ..., )nP P P P  is a partition of decision points into player sets, where 
( 1,2,..., )iP i n  is a player in the game, and player 0 is the chance player responsible for the random 
moves in the game. The information partition 0 1( , ,..., )nU U U U  is a partition of 
0 1( , ,..., )nP P P P , and 0U  and ( 1,2,..., )iU i n  are called the information sets of player 0 and 
player i , respectively. The payoff function 1( ) ( ( ),..., ( ))nh z h z h z  is real numbers corresponding to 
every end point z . When a play reaches z , each player ( 1,2,..., )i i n  gets the payoff ( )ih z . 
  We introduce the following terminology in order to examine a finite extensive form game . A pure 
strategy is  of player i  is a function that assigns a choice at u  to every iu U , and the set of all 
pure strategies of player i  is denoted by iS . A strategy combination 1( ,..., )ns s s  is a set of n-tuple 
pure strategies. Hence, a normal form game 1 1( ) ( ,..., ; ( ),..., ( ))n nG s s h s h s  of  is denoted by 
the expected payoffs of a strategy combination. The non-altruistic equilibrium of  can be defined in 
much the same way as the non-altruistic equilibrium of G . 
  It is well known that subgame perfect equilibria are a refinement of Nash equilibria, i.e. subgame 
perfect equilibria are proposed to compensate for the problem of Nash equilibria in extensive form 
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games. 
  Now, we define non-altruistic equilibria in extensive form. 
 
Definition 2: In , a strategy combination * * *1( ,..., )ns s s  constitutes an extensive form 
non-altruistic equilibrium if and only if it induces a non-altruistic equilibrium in every subgame of . 
 
  This definition means that an extensive form non-altruistic equilibrium occurs when every player 
plays a non-altruistic equilibrium in every subgame of . 
  We present the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: Every  has at least one extensive form non-altruistic equilibrium. 
 
Proof: We will prove this positive by induction on the length of , i.e. on the maximum number of 
moves in a play of . Consider a game  with m  nodes, and 0u  is the starting node of the game 
tree T . Let 1u , 2u , 3u , …, ku  denote the nodes that are connected to 0u  by a branch, and let 1T , 
2T , 3T , …, kT  be the disjoint subtrees of T  starting at these nodes. Each kT  corresponds to k . 
Therefore, k  possesses, by the induction hypothesis, an equilibrium solution ( )k ki i Ns s  in pure 
strategies. First, consider the case of only the starting node and end points. If 0u  is a chance node, then 
a branch is decided, and this leads to ( )k ki i Ns s  for player i . If 
0u  is a node of player i, then 
player i chooses a branch that satisfies: 
    * * *( , ) ( , ), ori i i i i ih s s h s s  
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    * * * * * *
; ;
for ( , ) ( , ), ( , ) ( , )      i i i i i i j i i j i i i i
j N j i j N j i
h s s h s s h s s h s s s S            (1) 
Therefore, Proposition 2 follows in this case. 
  Second, consider games that have nodes besides the starting node. Assume that the result is true for 
any game with less than m  nodes. Consider a game  with m  nodes. If a node is a chance node, 
then a branch is decided, and this leads to ( )k ki i Ns s  for player i . On the other hand, if a node is a 
node of player i , then player i  chooses a branch k  that leads to k  where his strategy satisfies (1). 
Thus, it is evident that s  is a pure equilibrium solution of . Q.E.D. 
 
  Next, we discuss the connections between extensive form non-altruistic and subgame perfect 
equilibria. 
 
Proposition 3: In , an extensive form non-altruistic equilibrium that satisfies * *( ) ( , )i i i ih s h s s is 
also a subgame perfect equilibrium, and vice versa. 
 
Proof: It is clear that a non-altruistic equilibrium that satisfies * *( ) ( , )i i i ih s h s s  is also a Nash 
equilibrium and vice versa. A strategy combination is a Nash equilibrium (a non-altruistic equilibrium) if 
the players’ strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium (a non-altruistic equilibrium) in the entire game, and 
a strategy combination is a subgame perfect equilibrium (an extensive form non-altruistic equilibrium) if 
the players’ strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium (a non-altruistic equilibrium) in every subgame 
including the entire game. Thus, the set of extensive form non-altruistic equilibria coincides with the set 
of subgame perfect equilibria. Thus, Proposition 3 is true. Q.E.D. 
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Proposition 4: In , every extensive form non-altruistic equilibrium is also a subgame perfect 
equilibrium, but not vice versa. 
 
Proof: Proposition 3 shows that in the case of * *( ) ( , )i i i ih s h s s  the set of extensive form 
non-altruistic equilibria coincides with the set of subgame perfect equilibria. 
  Therefore, we prove the case of * *( ) ( , )i i i ih s h s s . A strategy profile that satisfies 
* * *( , ) ( , )i i i i i ih s s h s s  is a Nash equilibrium. However, a non-altruistic equilibrium need to satisfy 
both * * *( , ) ( , )i i i i i ih s s h s s  and 
* * *
; ;
( , ) ( , )j i i j i i
j N j i j N j i
h s s h s s . In other words, a strategy 
profile that satisfies * * *
; ;
( , ) ( , )j i i j i i
j N j i j N j i
h s s h s s  for * * *( , ) ( , )i i i i i ih s s h s s  is a Nash 
equilibrium, but not a non-altruistic equilibrium. A strategy combination is a subgame perfect 
equilibrium (an extensive form non-altruistic equilibrium) if the players’ strategies constitute a Nash 
equilibrium (a non-altruistic equilibrium) in every subgame including the entire game, and the 
proposition follows. Q.E.D. 
 
 
5. An example of the extensive form representation 
  Let us consider the example depicted in Figure 5. In this game, player 1 moves at node 0u  and 
player 2 moves at node 1u  or node 2u . In this figure,  is a real number larger than 0 and smaller 
than 10. The normal form ( )G  of the extensive form game runs as Figure 6. Here, player 1 picks 
rows and player 2 picks columns. This game has four Nash equilibria: ( , )A AA , ( , )A AB , ( , )B BA  
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and ( , )B BB , and two subgame perfect equilibria: ( , )A AB  and ( , )B BB . 
  What happens to the equilibrium in this game if there is no agreement on player 2’s choice with the 
highest payoff of player 1 among choices with the same payoff for player 2? In the strategy profile 
( , )A AB , player 1’s payoff is 10, while player 2’s payoff is zero. Here, if player 2 chooses B , then the 
equilibrium payoffs are (0,0)  and player 1’s payoff decreases greatly. If player 1 chooses B  and 
player 2 also chooses B , then player 2’s payoff is 10. On the other hand, if player 1 chooses A , then 
even if player 2 chooses either A  or B , player 2’s payoff is zero. If player 1 chooses A , player 2 will 
not receive any payoff more than zero. That is, it can be said that the action by which player 1 chooses 
A  is a hostile one against player 2. Hence, if player 1 chooses A , player 2 will choose B . At this 
time, it can be said that player 1’s payoff when he chooses A  is zero. 
  In addition, if player 2 threatens player 1 that if player 1 chooses A , player 2 will choose B , then 
this threat will be credible because of 10 0 , and therefore player 1 should not choose A . That is, it 
can be thought that this result is an equilibrium, and the equilibrium payoffs are (10 ,10) . 
  In this game, the extensive form non-altruistic equilibrium is only ( , )B BB . This extensive form 
game has three subgames: (i) the entire game starting at node 0u , (ii) the subgame starting at node 1u  
and (iii) the subgame starting at node 2u . From Definition 2, we can see that ( , )A AB  is no extensive 
form non-altruistic equilibrium because it is only non-altruistic equilibria in subgames (i) and (iii). On 
the other hand, ( , )B BB  is an extensive form non-altruistic equilibrium because it is non-altruistic 
equilibria in all three subgames. 
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6. Conclusion 
  We have proposed non-altruistic equilibria as a criterion for equilibria of normal form games and have 
shown that the following cases exist: (i) every non-altruistic equilibrium is also a Nash equilibrium but 
vice versa, and (iii) not every normal form game has a non-altruistic equilibrium. In addition, we have 
proposed extensive form non-altruistic equilibria as a criterion for equilibria of finite extensive form 
games and have shown that (i) every finite extensive form game has at least one extensive form 
non-altruistic equilibrium, and (ii) every extensive form non-altruistic equilibria is a subgame perfect 
equilibria but not vice versa. It is impossible to find mixed-strategy non-altruistic equilibria in normal 
form games. However, we will study non-altruistic equilibria using methods instead of mixed strategies 
in the future. 
 
 
Appendix 
  In section 2, we defined a non-altruistic equilibrium. However, we can also define it as follows: 
 
Definition 2’: In G , a strategy combination * * *1( ,..., )ns s s  constitutes a non-altruistic equilibrium if 
and only if, every , ;i j N i j , 
    * * *( , ) ( , )i i i i i ih s s h s s , or 
    for * * *( , ) ( , )i i i i i ih s s h s s , 
* * *( , ) ( , )j i i j i ih s s h s s      i is S . 
 
  In this definition, each player gives higher priority to conduct the other players’ payoff minimizing 
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behavior. We illustrate the difference between Definition 1 and Definition 1’ using the following payoff 
matrices. 
  First, consider Figure 7. This example is a three-player game where each player  ( 1,2,3)i i  has 
two possible actions in his action sets ( iA  and iB ). This game has two Nash equilibria: 1 2 3( , , )B B A  
and 1 2 3( , , )B B B . However, in 1 2 3( , , )B B A , player 1’s payoff is 1 and player 2’s payoff is 4. In 
1 2 3( , , )B B B , player 1’s and player 2’s payoffs both are 5. By Definition 1 (Definition 1’), player 3 will 
pick A , not B . Therefore, the non-altruistic equilibrium is 1 2 3( , , )B B A , and the equilibrium payoffs 
are (1, 4, 5), which is worse for player 1 and player 2 than (5, 5, 5). 
  Next, consider Figure 8. This example also has two Nash equilibria: 1 2 3( , , )B B A  and 1 2 3( , , )B B B . 
In 1 2 3( , , )B B A , player 1’s payoff is 1 ( 5) , and player 2’s payoff is 6 ( 5) . The sum of player 1’s 
and player 2’s payoffs is 7. On the other hand, in 1 2 3( , , )B B B , the sum of player 1’s and player 2’s 
payoffs is 10. 
  If the game is played according to Definition 1, player 3 picks A , not B , and the equilibrium 
payoffs are (1, 6, 5), which is worse only for player 1 than (5, 5, 5). However, if the game is played 
according to Definition 1’, then player 3 picks B , not A , and the non-altruistic equilibrium is 
1 2 3( , , )B B B . 
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                                    A2        B2 
                           A1     10, 1       1, 1 
                           B1      5, 0       0, 0 
 
                Figure 1: A two-player game with two action sets (A and B). 
 
 
 
                                   A2        B2 
                A3         A1     4, 4, 4     3, 3, 3 
                          B1     3, 3, 3     2, 2, 2 
 
                                   A2        B2 
                B3         A1     2, 2, 2     1, 1, 1 
                          B1     1, 1, 1      0, 0, 0 
 
                Figure 2: A three-player game with two action sets (A and B). 
 
 
 
                                   A2     B2     C2 
                            A1   8, 8, 8  7, 7, 7  6, 6, 6 
                     A3              B1   8, 7, 0  6, 6, 6  5, 5, 5 
                            C1   6, 6, 6  5, 5, 5  4, 4, 4 
 
                                   A2     B2     C2 
                            A1   5, 5, 5  4, 4, 4  3, 3, 3 
               B3         B1   4, 4, 4  3, 3, 3  2, 2, 2 
                            C1   3, 3, 3  2, 2, 2  1, 1, 1 
 
                                   A2     B2     C2 
                            A1   2, 2, 2  1, 1, 1  0, 0, 0 
               C3           B1   1, 1, 1  0, 0, 0  3, 3, 3 
                            C1   0, 0, 0  3, 3, 3  5, 5, 5 
 
                Figure 3: A three-player game with three action sets (A, B, and C). 
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                                   A2        B2 
                A3         A1     0, 0, 0     1, 1, 1 
                          B1     1, 1, 1     5, 0, 3 
 
                                   A2        B2 
                B3         A1     1, 1, 1     2, 2, 2 
                          B1     2, 2, 2     3, 3, 3 
 
                Figure 4: A three-player game with two action sets (A and B). 
 
 
 
 Player 1                        Player 2 
                                (10, 0) 
  
                                            A 
                                   u1 
                                     
  
  
  
                  A                          B 
                                                          (0, 0) 
    u0 
 
    
 
 
                                                         (0, 0) 
                  B                          A 
 
 
 
 
                                  u2 
                                           B 
 
                              (10 – δ, 10) 
                Figure 5: An extensive form game. 
 
 
 
                      AA       AB        BA       BB 
                A    10, 0      10, 0        0, 0       0, 0 
                B     0, 0       0, 0    10 – , 10   10 – , 10 
 
                Figure 6: A normal form game. 
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                                   A2        B2 
                A3         A1     0, 0, 0     1, 1, 1 
                          B1     1, 1, 1     1, 4, 5 
 
                                   A2        B2 
                B3         A1     0, 0, 0     1, 1, 1 
                          B1     1, 1, 1     5, 5, 5 
 
                Figure 7: Player 2’s payoff of 4 in (B1, B2, A3). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   A2        B2  
                A3         A1     0, 0, 0     1, 1, 1 
                          B1     1, 1, 1     1, 6, 5 
 
                                   A2        B2 
                B3         A1     0, 0, 0     1, 1, 1 
                          B1     1, 1, 1     5, 5, 5 
 
                Figure 8: Player 2’s payoff of 6 in (B1, B2, A3). 
 
